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Abstract
The Universal Composability model (UC) by Canetti (FOCS 2001) allows for secure composition
of arbitrary protocols. We present a quantum version of the UC model which enjoys the same
compositionality guarantees. We prove that in this model statistically secure oblivious transfer
protocols can be constructed from commitments. Furthermore, we show that every statistically
classically UC secure protocol is also statistically quantum UC secure. Such implications are not
known for other quantum security definitions. As a corollary, we get that quantum UC secure
protocols for general multi-party computation can be constructed from commitments.
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1
1 Introduction
Since the inception of quantum key distribution by Bennett and Brassard [BB84], it has been known
that quantum communication permits to achieve protocol tasks that are impossible given only a
classical channel. For example, a quantum key distribution scheme [BB84] permits to agree on
a secret key that is statistically secret, using only an authenticated but not secret channel. (By
statistical security we mean security against computationally unbounded adversaries, also known as
information-theoretical security.) In contrast, when using only classical communication, it is easy
to see that such a secret key can always be extracted by a computationally sufficiently powerful
adversary. Similarly, based on an idea by Wiesner [Wie83], Bennett, Brassard, Cre´peau, and
Skubiszewska [BBCS91] presented a protocol that was supposed to construct an statistically secure
oblivious transfer1 protocol from a commitment, another feat that is easily seen to be impossible
classically.2 Oblivious transfer, on the other hand, has been recognized by Kilian [Kil88] to securely
evaluate arbitrary functions. Unfortunately, the protocol of Bennett et al. could, at the time, not
be proven secure, and the first complete proof of (a variant of) that protocol was given almost two
decades later by Damg˚ard, Fehr, Lunemann, Salvail, and Schaffner [DFL+09a].
Yet, although the oblivious transfer protocol satisfies the intuitive secrecy requirements of obliv-
ious transfer, in certain cases the protocol might lose its security when used in a larger context. In
other words, there are limitations on how the protocol can be composed. For example, no security
guarantee is given when several instances of the protocol are executed concurrently (see Section 1.5
for a more detailed explanations of the various restrictions).
The problem of composability has been intensively studied by the classical cryptography com-
munity (here and in the following, we use the word classical as opposed to quantum). To deal with
this problem in a general way, Canetti [Can01] introduced the notion of Universal Composabil-
ity, short UC (Pfitzmann and Waidner [PW01] independently introduced the equivalent Reactive
Simulatability framework). The UC framework allows to express the security of a multitude of
protocol tasks in a unified way, and any UC-secure protocol automatically enjoys strong compos-
ability guarantees (so-called universal composability). In particular, such a protocol can be run
concurrently with others, and it can be used as a subprotocol of other protocols in a general way.
Ben-Or and Mayers [BOM04] and Unruh [Unr04] have shown that the idea of UC-security can be
easily adapted to the quantum setting and have independently presented quantum variants of the
UC notion. These notions enjoy the same strong compositionality guarantees. Shortly afterwards,
Ben-Or, Horodecki, Leung, Mayers, and Oppenheim [BOHL+05] showed that many quantum key
distribution protocols are quantum-UC-secure.
Our contribution. In this work, we use the UC framework to show the existence of a statistically
secure and universally composable oblivious transfer protocol that uses only a commitment scheme.
Towards this goal, we first present a new definition of quantum-UC-security. In our opinion, our
notion is technically simpler than the notions of Ben-Or and Mayers [BOM04] and Unruh [Unr04].
1In an oblivious transfer protocol, Alice holds two bitstrings m0,m1, and Bob a bit c. Bob is supposed to get mc
but not m1−c, and Alice should not learn c.
2We remark that, on the other hand, Mayers [May97] shows that also in the quantum case, constructing an sta-
tistically secure commitment scheme without any additional assumption is impossible. However, under additional
assumptions like in the quantum bounded storage model by Damg˚ard, Fehr, Salvail, and Schaffner [DFSS05], statis-
tically secure bit commitment is possible. See Section 1.4 for a discussion of the implications of Mayers’ impossibility
result for our result.
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We believe that this may also help to increase the popularity of this notion in the quantum cryp-
tography community and to show the potential for using UC-security in the design of quantum
protocols. Second, we show that a variant of the protocol by Bennett et at. [BBCS91] is indeed
a UC-secure oblivious transfer protocol. By composing this protocol with a UC-secure protocol
for general multi-party computations by Ishai, Prabhakaran, and Sahai [IPS08], we get UC-secure
protocols for general multi-party computations using only commitments and a quantum channel –
this is easily seen to be impossible in a purely classical setting.
1.1 Quantum Universal Composability (quantum-UC)
We begin by giving an overview over the UC framework. The basic idea behind the UC framework
is to define security by comparison. Given a certain protocol task, say to implement a secure
message transfer, we first specify a machine, called the ideal functionality F that, by definition,
fulfills this protocol task securely. E.g., In the case of a secure message transfer, this functionality
would take a value x from Alice and give this value to Bob. All communication between parties and
the functionality is done over secure channels. Obviously, this functionality F does exactly what
we expect from a secure message transfer. Then, we define what it means for a protocol π to be a
secure implementation of F . Intuitively, we require that π is no less secure than F . In other words,
anything the adversary can do in an execution of π, the adversary could also do in an execution
using F . (And in particular, since F is secure by definition, the adversary then cannot perform
any successful attacks on π either.) This requirement is formally captured by requiring that for
any adversary Adv, there is another adversary Sim, the simulator, such that an execution of π with
Adv (called the real model) is indistinguishable from an execution of F with Sim (called the ideal
model). And indistinguishability in turn is modeled by requiring that no machine Z, called the
environment, can guess whether it is interacting with the real model or with the ideal model. More
precisely:
Definition 1 ((Classical) Universal Composability – informal) We say π classical-UC-
emulates F if for any adversary Adv there is a simulator Sim such that for all environments
Z we have that the difference between the following probabilities is negligible: The probability that
Z outputs 1 in an execution of Z, Adv, and π, and the probability that Z outputs 1 in an execution
of Z, Sim, and F . (We assume that Z can freely communicate with the adversary/simulator.)
In the example of a secure message transfer functionality F , the functionality would require its
inputs x from Z and then send x back to Z. In a secure message transfer protocol π, that is, in a
protocol π classical-UC-emulating F , Alice would than have to take the input x from Z, and Bob
would have to output x to Z (otherwise Z could trivially distinguish the real and the ideal model).
All communication send between Alice and Bob over insecure channels, however, would be under
the control of the adversary. Thus everything the adversary learns from that communication, the
simulator would have to be able to produce on its own; in particular, the adversary cannot derive
x from that communication since the simulator could not simulate that knowledge (in the ideal
model, the simulator cannot get x). This captures the intuitive requirement that a secure message
transfer protocol should not reveal the message to the adversary. In a similar way, other properties
like the authenticity of the message can be derived from the UC definition.
The UC definition comes in many flavors. For example, in computational classical UC-security
we restrict the adversary, simulator, and environment to polynomial-time machines. This variant
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is used if we want to show security based on computational assumptions. In statistical classical
UC, on the other hand, we quantify over all (possibly unbounded) adversaries, simulators, and
environments. This variant is used to model statistical security.
Besides providing a unified way to model the security of various protocol tasks by specifying
the ideal functionality, the UC framework allows for very general composition of protocols. Assume
a protocol σF that uses a functionality F as a building block. That is, in the real model, σF has
access to a functionality F that performs a certain task in a fully trusted way. (We say, σF runs in
the F-hybrid model.) Assume that σF classical-UC-emulates some other functionality G and that
we are given a protocol π that classical-UC-emulates F . Then the so-called universal composition
theorem states that σπ, the protocol resulting from using the subprotocol π instead of F , also
classical-UC-emulates G. This even holds if σF invokes many instances of F concurrently. Such a
composition theorem is very useful for proving the security of larger protocols in a modular way:
One first abstracts away a subprotocol (here π) by replacing it by some functionality (here F),
leading to a simpler protocol σF in the F-hybrid model that is more amenable to analysis. Then
the protocol π is analyzed separately. It should be noted that it was shown by Lindell [Lin03] that
no security notion weaker than (a particular variant of) classical UC can have such a composition
theorem.
To get a variant of the UC notion suitable for modeling quantum cryptography, we only need
to slightly modify the definition: Instead of quantifying over classical adversaries, simulators, and
environment, we quantify over quantum adversaries, simulators, and environment. That is, the
protocol parties, the adversary, the simulator, and the environment are allowed to store, send, and
compute with quantum states. (And in the computational variant of quantum-UC-security, we
additionally restrict adversaries, simulators, and environment to be restricted to polynomial-time
quantum computations.) Since, in a sense, we only change the machine model, most structural
theorems about UC-security, in particular the universal composition theorem, still hold for quantum-
UC-security; their proofs are almost identical in the classical and in the quantum setting. We present
our model of quantum-UC in Section 2 and give a universal composition theorem for that model.
1.2 UC-secure quantum oblivious transfer
The oblivious transfer (OT) protocol used in this paper is essentially the same a the protocol pro-
posed by Damg˚ard et al. [DFL+09a] which in turn is based on a protocol by Bennett et al. [BBCS91].
The basic idea of the protocol is that Alice encodes a random sequence x˜ of bits as a quantum state,
each bit randomly either in the computational basis or in the diagonal basis.3 Then Bob is supposed
to measure all bits, this time in random bases of his choosing. Then Alice sends the bases she used
to Bob. Let I= denote the indices of the bits x˜i where Alice and Bob chose the same basis, and I 6=
the indices of the bits where Alice and Bob chose different bases. Assume that Bob wants to receive
the message mc out of Alice’s messages m0,m1. Then Bob sets Ic := I= and I1−c := I 6= and sends
(I0, I1) to Alice. Alice will not know which of these two sets is which and hence does not learn c.
Bob will know the bits x˜i at indices i ∈ Ic. But even a dishonest Bob, assuming that he measured
the whole quantum state, will not know the bits at indices I1−c since he used the wrong bases for
these bits. Thus Alice uses the bits at I0 to mask her message m0, and the bits at I1 to mask
3If we were to use photons for transmission, in the computational basis we might encode the bit 0 as a vertically
polarized photon and the bits 1 as a horizontally polarized photon. In the diagonal basis we might encode the bit 0
as a 45◦-polarized photon, and the bit 1 as a 135◦-polarized photon.
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her message m1. Then Bob can recover mc but not m1−c. (To deal with the fact that a malicious
Bob might have partial knowledge about the bits at I1−c, we use so-called privacy amplification to
extract a near uniformly mask from these bits.)
The problem with this analysis is that we have assumed that a malicious Bob measures the
whole quantum state upon reception. But instead, Bob could store the quantum state until he
learns the bases that Alice used, and then use these bases to measure all bits x˜i accurately. Hence,
we need to force a dishonest Bob to measure all bits before Alice sends the bases. The idea of
Bennett et al. [BBCS91] is to introduce the following test: Bob has to commit to the bases he
used and to his measurement outcomes. Then Alice picks a random subset of the bits, and Bob
opens the commitments on his bases and outcomes corresponding to this subset of bits. Alice then
checks whether Bob’s measurement outcomes are consistent with what Alice sent. If Bob does not
measure enough bits, then he will commit to the wrong values in many of the commitments, and
there will be a high probability that Alice detects this.
It was a long-standing open problem what kind of a commitment needs to be used in order for
this protocol to be secure. Damg˚ard et al. [DFL+09a] give criteria for the commitment scheme under
which the OT protocol can be proven to have so-called stand-alone security; stand-alone security,
however, does not give as powerful compositionality guarantees as UC-security (cf. Section 1.5
below). In order to achieve UC-security, we assume that the commitment is given as an ideal
functionality. Then we have to show UC-security in the case of a corrupted Alice, and UC-security
in the case of a corrupted Bob. The case of a corrupted Alice is simple, as one can easily see that
no information flows from Bob to Alice (the commitment functionality does, by definition, not leak
any information about the committed values). The case of a corrupted Bob is more complex and
requires a careful analysis about the amount of information that Bob can retrieve about Alice’s
bits. Such an analysis has already been performed by Damg˚ard et al. [DFL+09a] in their setting.
Fortunately, we do not need to repeat the analysis. We show that that under certain special
conditions, stand-alone security already implies UC-security. Since in the case of a corrupted Bob,
these conditions are fulfilled, we get the security in the case of a corrupted Bob as a corollary from
the work by Damg˚ard et al. [DFL+09a].
In Section 5, we show that the OT protocol by Damg˚ard et al. [DFL+09a], when using an ideal
functionality for the commitment, is statistically quantum-UC-secure. Furthermore, the universal
composition theorem guarantees that we can replace the commitment functionality by any quantum-
UC-secure commitment protocol.
1.3 Quantum lifting and multi-party computation
We are now equipped with a statistically quantum-UC-secure OT protocol πQOT in the commitment-
hybrid model. As noted first by Kilian [Kil88], OT can be used for securely evaluating arbitrary
functions, short, OT is complete for multi-party computation. Furthermore, Ishai, Prabhakaran,
and Sahai [IPS08] showed that for any functionality G (even interactive functionalities that proceed
in several rounds), there is a classical protocol ρFOT in the OT-hybrid model that statistically
classical-UC-emulates G. Thus, to get a protocol for G in the commitment-hybrid model, we simply
replace all invocations to FOT by invocations of the subprotocol πQOT, resulting in a protocol
ρπQOT. We then expect that the security of ρπQOT follows directly using the universal composition
theorem (in its quantum variant). There is, however, one difficulty: To show that ρπQOT statistically
quantum-UC-emulates G, the universal composition theorem requires that the following premises
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are fulfilled: πQOT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FOT, and ρ
FOT statistically quantum-UC-
emulates G. But from the result of Ishai et al. [IPS08] we only have that ρFOT statistically classical-
UC-emulates G. Hence, we first have to show that the same result also holds with respect to
quantum-UC-security. Fortunately, we do not have to revisit the proof of Ishai et al., because we
show the following general fact:
Theorem 2 (Quantum lifting theorem – informal) If the protocols π and ρ are classical pro-
tocols, and π statistically classical-UC-emulates ρ, then and π statistically quantum-UC-emulates ρ.
Combining this theorem with the universal composition theorem, we immediately get that ρπQOT
statistically quantum-UC-emulates G. In other words, any multi-party computation can be per-
formed securely using only a commitment and a quantum-channel. In contrast, we show that in
the classical setting a commitment is not even sufficient to compute the AND-function.
We stress that a property like the quantum lifting theorem should not be taken for granted.
For example, for the so-called stand-alone model as considered by Fehr and Schaffner [FS09], no
corresponding property is known. A special case of security in the stand-alone model is the zero-
knowledge property: The question whether protocols that are statistical zero-knowledge with re-
spect to classical adversaries are also zero-knowledge with respect to quantum adversaries has been
answered positively by Watrous [Wat06] for particular protocols, but is still open in the general
case.
1.4 How to interpret our result
We show that we can perform arbitrary statistically UC-secure multi-party computations, given
a quantum channel and a commitment. However, Mayers [May97] has shown that, even in the
quantum setting, statistically secure commitment schemes do not exist, not even with respect to
security notions much weaker than quantum-UC-security. In the light of this result, the reader may
wonder whether our result is not vacuous. To illustrate why our result is useful even in the light of
Mayers’ impossibility result, we present four possible application scenarios.
Weaker computational assumptions. The first application of our result would be to combine
our protocols with a commitment scheme that is only computationally quantum-UC-secure. Of
course, the resulting multi-party computation protocol would then not be statistically secure any
more. However, since commitment intuitively seems to be a simpler task than oblivious transfer,
constructing a computationally quantum-UC-secure commitment scheme might be possible using
simpler computational assumptions, and our result then implies that the same computational as-
sumptions can be used for general multi-party computation.
Physical setup. One might seek a direct physical implementation of a commitment, such as
a locked strongbox (or an equivalent but technologically more advanced construct). With our
result, such a physical implementation would be sufficient for general multi-party computation.
In contrast, in a classical setting one would be forced to try to find physical implementations of
OT. It seems that a commitment might be a simpler physical assumption than OT (or at least an
incomparable one). So our result reduces the necessary assumptions when implementing general
multi-party computation protocols based on physical assumptions. Also, Kent [Ken99] proposes to
build commitments based on the fact that the speed of light is bounded. Although it is not clear
whether his schemes are UC-secure (and in particular, how to model his physical assumptions in
6
the UC framework), his ideas might lead to a UC-secure commitment scheme that then, using our
result, gives general UC-secure multi-party computation based on the limitation of the speed of
light.
Theoretical separation. Our result can also be seen from the purely theoretical point of view. It
gives a separation between the quantum and the classical setting by showing that in the quantum
setting, commitment is complete for general statistically secure multi-party computation, while
in the classical world it is not. Such separations – even without practical applications – may
increase our understanding of the relationship between the classical and the quantum setting and
are therefore arguably interesting in their own right.
Long-term security. Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh [MQU07b] introduce the concept of long-term UC-
security. In a nutshell, long-term UC-security is a strengthening of computational UC-security that
guarantees that a protocol stays secure even if the adversary gets unlimited computational power
after the protocol execution. This captures the fact that, while we might confidently judge today’s
technology, we cannot easily make predictions about which computational problems will be hard
in the future. Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh show that (classically) long-term UC-secure commitment
protocols exist given certain practical infrastructure assumptions, so-called signature cards. It is,
however, likely that their results cannot be extended to achieve general multi-party computation.
Our result, on the other hand, might allow to overcome this limitation: Assume that we show that
the commitment protocol of Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh is also secure in a quantum variant of long-
term UC-security. Then we could compose that commitment protocol with the protocols presented
here, leading to long-term UC-secure general multi-party protocols from signature cards.
1.5 Compositionality restrictions in prior work
Above, we claimed that the results of prior work on commitment schemes in the quantum setting
have limitations concerning their composability guarantees. We will now briefly explain in which
cases composition is possible in prior models, and what the restrictions are. All prior results giving
some kind of composability guarantee work in the some variant of the so-called stand-alone model.
The basic idea of the stand-alone model is similar to that of the UC model: We specify a protocol
π and an ideal functionality F , and we say that π implements F in the stand-alone model if for
every adversary Adv attacking π (real model), there is a simulator Sim attacking F (ideal model),
so that the real and the ideal model are indistinguishable. But in contrast to the UC model,
indistinguishability of the real and the ideal model is not defined with respect to an environment
that tries to guess which model it is interacting with. Instead, given fixed inputs for all honest
parties, we require that the output of the honest parties and of the adversary (considered as a
joint quantum state) is indistinguishable from the output of the functionality and of the simulator
(considered as a joint quantum state). The notion of indistinguishability of quantum states is then
defined depending of the flavor of the stand-alone model. Security in the stand-alone model is
strictly weaker than security in the UC model: the UC environment may introduce additional
dependencies between the messages send in the protocol and the protocol inputs/outputs. For
example, the environment could give a message that has been sent over an insecure channel by
Bob as initial protocol input to Alice. Such dependencies are explicitly excluded in the stand-alone
model.
In the classical case, it has been shown by Canetti [Can00] that the stand-alone model allows for
sequential composition. Sequential composition means that we are allowed to run several protocols
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or several instances of one protocol one after the other without loosing security, but we are not
allowed to run them concurrently or interleave the protocol steps (as can easily happen if the
protocol parties are not careful about their synchronization). Similar results have been obtained
in the quantum case by Wehner and Wullschleger [WW08] and by Fehr and Schaffner [FS09] for
different variants of the quantum stand-alone model.
There are two main flavors of the quantum stand-alone model: Statistical and computational
security. In the first case, adversary and simulator are allowed to be unlimited, and in the second
case, adversary and simulator are computationally bounded. Note that when defined like this, sta-
tistical stand-alone security does not imply computational stand-alone security because statistical
stand-alone security does not guarantee that the simulator corresponding to a computationally
bounded adversary is also computationally bounded. The effect of this is slightly paradoxical: one
can compose statistically secure protocols with each other, and one can compose computationally
secure protocols with each other, but no guarantees are given if one composes a computationally
secure protocol with a statistically secure protocol.
We note that the problems arising from an unlimited simulator can be avoided by simply
strengthening the statistical stand-alone model and requiring that the simulator is computationally
bounded if the adversary is. This is the approach we also take in our modeling of statistical
quantum-UC-security.
The protocols analyzed by Wehner and Wullschleger [WW08] and Fehr and Schaffner [FS09]
are proven secure in (different variants of) the statistical stand-alone model. Furthermore, the
simulator they construct does not run in polynomial time, therefore their results do not imply
computational stand-alone security and the difficulties outlined above apply.
The situation concerning the OT protocol analyzed by Damg˚ard, Fehr, Lunemann, Salvail, and
Schaffner [DFL+09a] is even more subtle. They prove that in the case of a corrupted recipient Bob,
their protocol is secure in the computational stand-alone model. Furthermore, for a corrupted sender
Alice, the protocol is secure in the statistical stand-alone model with non-polynomial-time simulator.
Thus, the protocol can be composed sequentially with other protocols that are computationally
secure for corrupted Bob and statistically secure for corrupted Alice; yet it cannot be composed with
protocols which are statistically secure for corrupted Bob and computationally secure for corrupted
Alice. In particular, the OT protocol cannot be composed with another instance of itself where Bob
is the sender. The full version [DFL+09b, Section 5] of their paper describes an extension of the
underlying commitment scheme which enables the construction of an efficient simulator. With such
an extension, sequential composition of their OT protocol with computationally secure protocols is
possible.
In all three papers, when composing classical and quantum protocols, it is necessary that even
the classical protocols are proven secure with respect to a definition involving quantum adversaries.
A result like our quantum lifting theorem (Theorem 2) is an open problem in the stand-alone
model.
1.6 Related work
Security models. General quantum security models based on the stand-alone model have first
been proposed by van de Graaf [vdG98]. His model comes without a composition theorem. The
notion has been refined by Wehner and Wullschleger [WW08] and by Fehr and Schaffner [FS09]
who also prove sequential composition theorems. Quantum security models in the style of the UC
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model have been proposed by Ben-Or and Mayers [BOHL+05] and by Unruh [Unr04]. The original
idea behind the UC framework in the classical setting was independently discovered by Canetti
[Can01] and by Pfitzmann and Waidner [PW01] (the notion is called Reactive Simulatability in the
latter paper).
Quantum protocols. The idea of using quantum communication for cryptographic purposes
seems to originate from Wiesner [Wie83]. The idea gained widespread recognition with the BB84
quantum key-exchange protocol by Bennett and Brassard [BB84]. A statistically hiding and binding
commitment scheme was proposed by Brassard, Cre´peau, Jozsa, and Langlois [BCJL93]. Unfortu-
nately, the scheme was later found to be insecure; in fact, Mayers [May97] showed that statistically
hiding and binding quantum commitments are impossible without using additional assumptions.
Kent [Ken99] circumvents this impossibility result by proposing a statistically hiding and binding
commitment scheme that is based on the limitation of the speed of light. Bennett, Brassard, Cre´-
peau, and Skubiszewska [BBCS91] present a protocol for statistically secure oblivious transfer in
the quantum setting. They prove their protocol secure under the assumption that the adversary
cannot store qubits and measures each qubit individually. They also sketch an extension that uses
a commitment scheme to make their OT protocol secure against adversaries that can store and
compute on quantum states. The protocol analyzed in the present paper is, in its basic idea, that
extension. Yao [Yao95] gave a partial proof of the extended OT protocol. His proof, however,
is incomplete and refers to a future complete paper which, to the best of our knowledge, never
appeared. As far as we know, the first complete proof of a variant of that OT protocol has been
given by Damg˚ard, Fehr, Lunemann, Salvail, and Schaffner [DFL+09a]; their protocol is secure in
the stand-alone model. Hofheinz and Mu¨ller-Quade [HMQ03] conjectured that the extended OT
protocol by Bennett et al. [BBCS91] is indeed UC-secure; in the present paper we prove this claim.
Damg˚ard, Fehr, Salvail, and Schaffner [DFSS05] have presented OT and commitment protocols
which are statistically secure under the assumption that the adversary has a bounded quantum
storage capacity.
Classical vs. quantum security. To the best of our knowledge, van de Graaf [vdG98] was the first
to notice that even statistically secure classical protocols are not necessarily secure in a quantum
setting. The reason is that the powerful technique of rewinding the adversary is not available in the
quantum setting. Watrous [Wat06] showed that in particular cases, a technique similar to classical
rewinding can be used. He uses this technique to construct quantum zero-knowledge proofs. No
general technique relating classical and quantum security is known; to the best of our knowledge,
our quantum lifting theorem is the first such result (although restricted to the statistical UC model).
Miscellaneous. Kilian [Kil88] first noted that OT is complete for general multi-party computation.
Ishai, Prabhakaran, and Sahai [IPS08] prove that this also holds in the UC setting. Computationally
secure UC commitment schemes have been presented by Canetti and Fischlin [CF01].
1.7 Preliminaries
General. A nonnegative function µ is called negligible if for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large k,
µ(k) < k−c. A nonnegative function f is called overwhelming if f ≥ 1 − µ for some negligible µ.
Keywords in typewriter font (e.g., environment) are assumed to be fixed but arbitrary, distinct
non-empty words in {0, 1}∗. ε ∈ {0, 1}∗ denotes the empty word. Given a sequence x = x1, . . . , xn,
and a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, x|I denote the sequence x restricted to the indices i ∈ T .
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Quantum systems. We can only give a few terse overview over the formalism used in quantum
computing. For a thorough introduction, we recommend the textbook by Nielsen and Chuang
[NC00, Chap. 1–2]. A (pure) state in a quantum system is described by a vector |ψ〉 in some
Hilbert space H. In this work, we only use Hilbert spaces of the form H = CN for some countable
set N , usually N = {0, 1} for qubits or N = {0, 1}∗ for bitstrings. We always assume a designated
orthonormal basis {|x〉 : x ∈ N} for each Hilbert space, called the computational basis. The
basis states |x〉 represent classical states (i.e., states without superposition). Given several separate
subsystems H1 = C
N1 , . . . ,Hn = C
Nn , we describe the joint system by the tensor product H1 ⊗
· · · ⊗ Hn = C
N1×···×Nn . We write 〈Ψ| for the linear transformation mapping |Φ〉 to the scalar
product 〈Ψ|Φ〉. Consequently, |Ψ〉〈Ψ| denotes the orthogonal projector on |Ψ〉. We set |0〉+ := |0〉,
|1〉+ := |1〉, |0〉× := 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉), and |1〉× :=
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). For x ∈ {0, 1}n and θ ∈ {+,×}n, we
define |x〉θ := |x1〉θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉θn .
Mixed states. If a system is not in a single pure state, but instead is in the pure state |Ψi〉 ∈ H
with probability pi (i.e., it is in a mixed state), we describe the system by a density operator
ρ =
∑
i pi|Ψi〉〈Ψi| over H. This representation contains all physically observable information about
the distribution of states, but some distributions are not distinguishable by any measurement and
are represented by the same mixed state. The set of all density operators is the set of all positive4
operators H with trace 1, and is denoted P(H). Composed systems are descibed by operators
in P(H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hn). In the following, when speaking about (quantum) states, we always mean
mixed states in the density operator representation. A mapping E : P(H1) → P(H2) represents a
physically possible operation (realizable by a sequence of unitary transformations, measurements,
and initializations and removals of qubits) iff it is a completely positive trace preserving map.5
We call such mappings superoperators. The superoperator Eminit on P(H) with H := C
{0,1}∗ and
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is defined by Eminit(ρ) := |m〉〈m| for all ρ.
Composed systems. Given a superoperator E on P(H1), the superoperator E ⊗ id operates
on P(H1 ⊗ H2). Instead of saying “we apply E ⊗ id”, we say “we apply E to H1”. If we say
“we initialize H with m”, we mean “we apply Eminit to H”. Given a state ρ ∈ P(H1 ⊗ H2), let
ρx := (|x〉〈x| ⊗ id)ρ(|x〉〈x| ⊗ id). Then the outcome of measuring H1 in the computational basis
is x with probability tr ρx, and after measuring x, the quantum state is
ρx
tr ρx
. Since we will only
performs measurements in the computational basis in this work, we will omit the qualification “in
the computational basis”. The terminology in this paragraph generalizes to systems composed of
more than two subsystems.
Classical states. Classical probability distributions P : N → [0, 1] over a countable set N
are represented by density operators ρ ∈ P(CN ) with ρ =
∑
x∈N P (x)|x〉〈x| where {|x〉} is the
computational basis. We call a state classical if it is of this form. We thus have a canonical
isomorphism between the classical states over CN and the probability distributions over N . We call
a superoperator E : P(CN1) → P(CN2) classical iff if there is a randomized function F : N1 → N2
such that E(ρ) =
∑
x∈N1
y∈N2
Pr[F (x) = y] · 〈x|ρ|x〉 · |y〉〈y|. Classical superoperators describe what
can be realized with classical computations. An example of a classical superoperator on P(CN ) is
Eclass : ρ 7→
∑
x〈x|ρ|x〉 · |x〉〈x|. Intuitively, Eclass measures ρ in the computational basis and then
4We call an operator positive if it is Hermitean and has only nonnegative Eigenvalues.
5A map E is completely positive iff for all Hilbert spaces H′, and all positive operators ρ over H1⊗H
′, (E ⊗ id)(ρ)
is positive.
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discards the outcome, thus removing all superpositions from ρ.
2 Quantum Universal Composability
We now present our quantum-UC-framework. For a motivation of the model, we refer to Sec-
tion 1.1.
Machine model. A machine M is described by an identity idM in {0, 1}
∗ and a sequence of
superoperators E
(k)
M (k ∈ N) on H
state ⊗Hclass ⊗Hquant with Hstate ,Hclass ,Hquant := C{0,1}
∗
(the
state transition operators). The index k in E
(k)
M denotes the security parameter. The Hilbert space
Hstate represents the state kept by the machine between invocations, and Hclass and Hquant are
used both for incoming and outgoing messages. Any message consists of a classical part stored in
Hclass and a quantum part stored in Hquant . If a machine id sender wishes to send a message with
classical part m and quantum part |Ψ〉 to a machine id rcpt , the machine idsender initializes H
class
with (id sender , id rcpt ,m) and H
quant with |Ψ〉. (See the definition of the network execution below
for details.) The separation of messages into a classical and a quantum part is for clarity only, all
information could also be encoded directly in a single register. If a machine does not wish to send
a message, it initializes Hclass and Hquant with ε.
A network N is a set of machines with pairwise distinct identities containing a machine Z with
idZ = environment. We write idsN for the set of the identities of the machines in N.
We call a machine M quantum-polynomial-time if there is a uniform6 sequence of quantum
circuits Ck such that for all k, the circuit Ck implements the superoperator E
(k)
M .
Network execution. The state space HN for a network N is defined as HN := H
class ⊗Hquant ⊗⊗
id∈idsN H
state
id with H
state
id ,H
class ,Hquant := C{0,1}
∗
. Here Hstateid represents the local state of the
machine with identity id and Hclass and Hquant represent the state spaces used for communication.
(Hclass and Hquant are shared between all machines. Since only one machine is active at a time, no
conflicts occur.)
A step in the execution of N is defined by a superoperator E := E
(k)
N
operating on HN. This
superoperator performs the following steps: First, E measures Hclass in the computational basis,
and parses the outcome as (id sender , id rcpt ,m). Let M be the machine in N with identity id rcpt .
Then E applies E
(k)
M to H
state
id ⊗ H
class ⊗ Hquant . Then E measures Hclass and parses the outcome
as (id ′sender , id
′
rcpt ,m
′). If the outcome could not be parsed, or if id ′sender 6= id rcpt , initialize H
class
with (ε, environment, ε) and Hquant with ε. (This ensures that the environment is activated if a
machine sends no or an ill-formed message.)
The output of the network N on input z and security parameter k is described by the following
algorithm: Let ρ ∈ P(HN) be the state that is initialized to (ε, environment, z) in H
class , and
to the empty word ε in all other registers. Then repeat the following indefinitely: Apply E
(k)
N
to
ρ. Measure Hclass . If the outcome is of the form (environment, ε, out ), return out and terminate.
Otherwise, continue the loop. The probability distribution of the return value out is denoted by
ExecN(k, z).
6A sequence of circuits Ck is uniform if a deterministic Turing machine can output the description of Ck in time
polynomial in k.
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Corruptions. To model corruptions, we introduce corruption parties, special machines that follow
the instructions given by the adversary. When invoked, the corruption party PCid with identity id
measures Hclass and parses the outcome as (id sender , id rcpt ,m). If idsender = adversary, H
class
is initialized with m. (In this case, m specifies both the message and the sender/recipient. Thus
the adversary can instruct a corruption party to send to arbitrary recipients.) Otherwise, Hclass is
initialized with (id , adversary, (id sender , id rcpt ,m)). (The message is forwarded to the adversary.)
Note that, since PCid does not touch the H
quant , the quantum part of the message is forwarded.
Given a network N, and a set of identities C, we write NC for the set resulting from replacing
each machine M ∈N with identity id ∈ C by PCid .
Security model. A protocol π is a set of machines with environment, adversary /∈ ids(π). We
assume a set of identities partiesπ ⊆ ids(π) to be associated with π. partiesπ denotes which of the
machines in the protocol are actually protocol parties (as opposed to incorruptible entities such as
ideal functionalities).
An environment is a machine with identity environment, an adversary or a simulator is a
machine with identity adversary (there is no formal distinction between adversaries and simulators,
the two terms refer to different intended roles of a machine).
In the following we call two networks indistinguishable if there is a negligible function µ such
that for all z ∈ {0, 1}∗ and k ∈ N, |Pr[ExecN (k, z) = 1] − Pr[ExecM (k, z) = 1]| ≤ µ(k). We speak
of perfect indistinguishability if µ = 0.
Definition 3 (Statistical quantum-UC-security) Let protocols π and ρ be given. We say π
statistically quantum-UC-emulates ρ iff for every set C ⊆ partiesπ and for every adversary Adv
there is a simulator Sim such that for every environment Z, the networks πC ∪ {Adv,Z} (called
the real model) and ρC ∪ {Sim,Z} (called the ideal model) are indistinguishable. We furthermore
require that if Adv is quantum-polynomial-time, so is Sim.
Definition 4 (Computational quantum-UC-security) Let protocols π and ρ be given. We say
π computationally quantum-UC-emulates ρ iff for every set C ⊆ partiesπ and for every quantum-
polynomial-time adversary Adv there is a quantum-polynomial-time simulator Sim such that for
every quantum-polynomial-time environment Z, the networks πC ∪{Adv,Z} and ρC ∪{Sim,Z} are
indistinguishable.
Note that although ExecπC∪{Adv,Z}(k, z) may return arbitrary bitstrings, we only compare whether
the return value of Z is 1 or not. This effectively restricts Z to returning a single bit. This can be
done without loss of generality (see [Can01] for a discussion this issue; their arguments also apply
to the quantum case) and simplifies the definition.
In our framework, any communication between two parties is perfectly secure since the network
model guarantees that they are delivered to the right party and not leaked to the adversary. To
model a protocol with insecure channels instead, one would explicitly instruct the protocol parties
to send all messages through the adversary. Authenticated channels can be realized by introducing
an ideal functionality (see the next section) that realizes an authenticated channel. For simplicity,
we only consider protocols with secure channels in this work.
2.1 Ideal functionalities
In most cases, the behavior of the ideal model is described by a single machine F , the so-called ideal
functionality. We can think of this functionality as a trusted third party that perfectly implements
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the desired protocol behavior. For example, the functionality FOT for oblivious transfer would take
as input from Alice two bitstrings m0,m1, and from Bob a bit c, and send to Bob the bitstring
mc. Obviously, such a functionality constitutes a secure oblivious transfer. We can thus define
a protocol π to be a secure OT protocol if π quantum-UC-emulates FOT where FOT denotes
the protocol consisting only of one machine, the functionality FOT itself. There is, however, one
technical difficulty here. In the real protocol π, the bitstring mc is sent to the environment Z by
Bob, while in a the ideal model, mc is sent by the functionality. Since every message is tagged
with the sender of that message, Z can distinguish between the real and the ideal model merely
by looking at the sender of mc. To solve this issue, we need to ensure that F sends the message
mc in the name of Bob (and for analogous reasons, that F receives messages sent by Z to Alice
or Bob). To achieve this, we use so-called dummy-parties [Can01] in the ideal model. These are
parties with the identities of Alice and Bob that just forward messages between the functionality
and the environment.
Definition 5 (Dummy-party) Let a machine P and a functionality F be given. The dummy-
party P˜ for P and F is a machine that has the same identity as P and has the following state
transition operator: Let idF be the identity of F . When activated, measure Hclass . If the outcome
of the measurement is of the form (environment, idP ,m), initialize H
class with (idP , idF ,m). If
the outcome is of the form (idF , idP ,m), initialize Hclass with (idP , environment,m). In all cases,
the quantum communication register is not modified (i.e., the message in that register is forwarded).
Note the strong analogy to the corruption parties (page 12).
Thus, if we write π quantum-UC-emulates F , we mean that π quantum-UC-emulates ρF where
ρF consists of the functionality F and the dummy-parties corresponding to the parties in π. More
precisely:
Definition 6 Let π be a protocol and F be a functionality. We say that π statisti-
cally/computationally quantum-UC-emulates F if π statistically/computationally quantum-UC-
emulates ρF where ρF := {P˜ : P ∈ partiesπ} ∪ {F}.
For more discussion of dummy-parties and functionalities, see [Can01].
Using the concept of an ideal functionality, we can specify a range of protocol tasks by simply
defining the corresponding functionality. Below, we give the definitions of various functionalities.
All these functionalities are classical, we therefore do not explicitly describe when the registers
Hclass and Hquant are measured/initialized but instead describe the functionality in terms of the
messages sent and received.
Definition 7 (Commitment) Let A and B be two parties. The functionality FB→A,ℓCOM behaves as
follows: Upon (the first) input (commit, x) with x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(k) from B, send committed to A. Upon
input open from B send (open, x) to A. All communication/input/output is classical.
We call B the sender and A the recipient.
Definition 8 (Oblivious transfer (OT)) Let A and B be two parties. The functionality FA→B,ℓOT
behaves as follows: When receiving input (s0, s1) from A with s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(k) and c ∈ {0, 1} from
B, send s := sc to B. All communication/input/output is classical.
We call A the sender and B the recipient.7
7We used A as the sender in the description of the OT functionality, and as the recipient in the description of
the commitment functionality. We do so to simplify notation later; our protocol for OT from A to B will use a
commitment from B to A.
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Definition 9 (Randomized oblivious transfer (ROT)) Let A and B be two parties. The
functionality FA→B,ℓROT behaves as follows: If A is uncorrupted, when receiving input c ∈ {0, 1} from
B, choose s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(k) uniformly and send (s0, s1) to A and s := sc to B. If A is corrupted,
when receiving input (s0, s1) from A with s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(k) and c ∈ {0, 1} from B, send s := sc to
B. All communication/input/output is classical.
2.2 Elementary properties of UC-security
Lemma 10 (Reflexivity, transitivity) Let π, ρ, and σ be protocols. Then π quantum-UC-
emulates π. If π quantum-UC-emulates ρ and ρ quantum-UC-emulates σ, then π quantum-UC-
emulates σ.
This holds both for statistical and computational quantum-UC-security.
Proof. We first consider the case of statistical quantum-UC-security.
For any adversary Adv and any set C, with Sim := Adv, we have that πC ∪{Adv,Z} and πC ∪
{Sim,Z} are equal and hence perfectly indistinguishable for all Z. If Adv is quantum-polynomial-
time, so is Sim = Adv. Thus π quantum-UC-emulates ρ.
Assume that π quantum-UC-emulates ρ and ρ quantum-UC-emulates σ. Fix an adversary Adv
and a set C. Then there is a simulator Sim such that for all Z, πC ∪ {Adv,Z} and ρC ∪ {Sim,Z}
are indistinguishable. Furthermore, for the adversary Adv′ := Sim, there is a simulator Sim′ such
that ρC ∪ {Sim,Z} = ρC ∪ {Adv′,Z} and σC ∪ {Sim′,Z} are indistinguishable for all Z. Since
indistinguishability is transitive, πC ∪ {Adv,Z} and σC ∪ {Sim′,Z} are indistinguishable for all
Z. Finally, if Adv is quantum-polynomial-time, so is Adv′ = Sim, and thus also Sim′. Thus π
quantum-UC-emulates σ.
In the case of computational quantum-UC-security, the proof is identical, except that we quan-
tify over quantum-polynomial-time Adv and Z. 
Dummy-adversary. In the definition of UC-security, we have three entities interacting with
the protocol: the adversary, the simulator, and the environment. Both the adversary and the
environment are all-quantified, hence we would expect that they do, in some sense, work together.
This intuition is backed by the following fact which was first noted by Canetti [Can01]: Without
loss of generality, we can assume an adversary that is completely controlled by the environment.
This so-called dummy-adversary only forwards messages between the environment and the protocol.
The actual attack is then executed by the environment.
Definition 11 (Dummy-adversary Advdummy) When activated, the dummy-adversary
Advdummy measures H
class ; call the outcome m. If m is of the form (environment, adversary,
m′), initialize Hclass with m′. Otherwise initialize Hclass with (adversary, environment,m). In
all cases, the quantum communication register is not modified (i.e., the message in that register is
forwarded).
Note the strong analogy to the dummy-parties (Definition 5) and the corruption parties (page 12).
Lemma 12 (Completeness of the dummy-adversary) Assume that π quantum-UC-
emulates ρ with respect to the dummy-adversary (i.e., instead of quantifying over all adversaries
Adv, we fix Adv := Advdummy ). Then π quantum-UC-emulates ρ.
This holds both for statistical and computational quantum-UC-security.
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Figure 1: Completeness of the dummy-adversary: proof steps
Proof. We first consider the case of statistical quantum-UC-security.
Assume that π statistically quantum-UC-emulates ρ with respect to the dummy-adversary. Fix
an adversary Adv. We have to show that there exists a simulator Sim such that for all environments
Z we have that π ∪ {Adv,Z} and ρ ∪ {Sim,Z} are indistinguishable. Furthermore, if Adv is
quantum-polynomial-time, Sim has to be quantum-polynomial-time, too.
For a given environment Z, we construct an environment ZAdv that is supposed to interact with
Advdummy and internally simulates Z and Adv, and that routes all messages sent by the simulated
Adv to π through Advdummy and vice versa. Then π ∪ {Adv,Z} and π ∪ {Advdummy ,ZAdv} are
perfectly indistinguishable. (Cf. networks (I) and (II) in Figure 1.) Since π statistically quantum-
UC-emulates ρ with respect to the dummy-adversary, we have that π ∪ {Advdummy ,ZAdv} and
ρ ∪ {Sim′,ZAdv} are indistinguishable for some Sim′ and all Z. (Cf. networks (II) and (III).) Since
Advdummy is quantum-polynomial-time, so is Sim
′. We construct a machine Sim that internally
simulates Sim′ and Adv (network (IV)). Then ρ∪{Sim′,ZAdv} and ρ∪{Sim,Z} are perfectly indis-
tinguishable. Summarizing, π∪{Adv,Z} and ρ∪{Sim,Z} are indistinguishable for all environments
Z. Furthermore, since Sim′ is quantum-polynomial-time, we have that Sim is quantum-polynomial-
time if Adv is. This concludes the proof in the case of statistical quantum-UC-security.
The proof in the case of computational quantum-UC-security is identical, except that we con-
sider only quantum-polynomial-time Adv and Z, and thus have that ZAdv, Sim
′, and Sim are
quantum-polynomial-time. 
2.3 Universal composition
For some protocol σ, and some protocol π, by σπ we denote the protocol where σ invokes (up to
polynomially many) instances of π. That is, in σπ the machines from σ and from π run together
in one network, and the machines from σ access the inputs and outputs of π. (That is, σ plays
the role of the environment from the point of view of π. In particular, Z then talks only to σ
and not to the subprotocol π directly.) A typical situation would be that σF is some protocol that
makes use of some ideal functionality F , say a commitment functionality, and then σπ would be the
protocol resulting from implementing that functionality with some protocol π, say a commitment
protocol. (We say that σF is a protocol in the F-hybrid model.) One would hope that such an
implementation results in a secure protocol σπ. That is, we hope that if π quantum-UC-emulates F
and σF quantum-UC-emulates G, then σπ quantum-UC-emulates G. Fortunately, this is the case:
Theorem 13 (Universal Composition Theorem) Let π, ρ, and σ be quantum-polynomial-
time protocols. Assume that π quantum-UC-emulates ρ. Then σπ quantum-UC-emulates σρ.
This holds both for statistical and computational quantum-UC-security.
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Figure 2: Networks occurring in the proof sketch of Theorem 13. Network (I) represents the real
model, (II) the ideal model, and (III) the hybrid case. To avoid cluttering, in (III), the connections
to πi−1, Sim′i+1, and ρi+1 have been omitted.
If we additionally have that σ quantum-UC-emulates G, from the transitivity of quantum-UC-
emulation (Lemma 10), it immediately follows that σπ quantum-UC-emulates G.
The compositionality guarantee given by Theorem 13 is often called universal composability.
One should not confuse universal composability with UC-security. Although UC security implies
universal composability, it has been shown by Hofheinz and Unruh [HU05, HU06, Unr06] that – in
the classical setting at least – universal composability is a strictly weaker notion than UC security.
Proof of Theorem 13. We first show Theorem 13 for the case of computational quantum-UC-
security. Thus, our goal is to prove that under the assumptions of Theorem 13, σπ computationally
quantum-UC-emulates σρ. Since σ is quantum-polynomial-time, σ invokes at most a polynomial
number n of instances of its subprotocol π or ρ. Since π quantum-UC-emulates ρ, there is a quantum-
polynomial-time simulator Sim′ such that for all environments Z we have that π ∪ {Advdummy ,Z}
and ρ ∪ {Sim′,Z} are indistinguishable. In the following, we call Sim′ the dummy-simulator.
Let a quantum-polynomial-time adversary Adv be given (that is supposed to attack σπ). We con-
struct a simulator Sim that internally simulates the adversary Adv and n instances Sim′1, . . . ,Sim
′
n
of the dummy-simulator Sim′. The simulated adversary Adv is connected to the environment and
to the protocol σ, but all messages between Adv and the i-th instance πi of π are routed through
the dummy-simulator-instance Sim′i (which is then supposed to transform these messages into a
form suitable for instances of ρ). The simulator Sim is depicted by the dashed box in network (II)
in Figure 2.
We have to show that for any environment Z we have that σπ∪{Adv,Z} and σρ∪{Sim,Z} are
indistinguishable, i.e., that the output of Z in the networks (I) and (II) in Figure 2 is statistically
indistinguishable.
For this, we construct a hybrid environment Zσ,i. (It is depicted as the dashed box in network
(III) in Figure 2.) This environment simulates the machines Z, Adv, the protocol σ, instances
π1, . . . , πi−1 of the real protocol π, and instances Sim′i+1, . . . ,Sim
′
n and ρi+1, . . . , ρn of the dummy-
simulator Sim′ and the ideal protocol ρ, respectively. The communication between Z, Adv, and σ is
directly forwarded byZσ,i. Communication between Adv and the j-th protocol instance is forwarded
as follows: If j < i, the communication is simply forwarded to πj. If j > i, the communication
is routed through the corresponding dummy-simulator Sim′j (which is then supposed to transform
these messages into a form suitable for ρi). And finally, if j = i, the communication is passed to
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the adversary/simulator outside of Zσ,i. Communication between σ and the instances of π or ρ is
directly forwarded.
We will now show that there is a negligible function µ such that |Pr[Execπ∪{Advdummy ,Zσ,i}(k, z) =
1] − Pr[Execρ∪{Sim′,Zσ,i}(k, z) = 1]| ≤ µ(k) for any security parameter k and any i = 1, . . . , n.
For this, construct an environment Zσ which expects as its initial input a pair (i, z), and then
runs Zσ,i with input z. Since π ∪ {Advdummy ,Z} and ρ ∪ {Sim
′,Z} are indistinguishable for
all quantum-polynomial-time environments Z, there exists a negligible function µ such that the
difference of Pr[Execπ∪{Advdummy ,Zσ,i}(k, z) = 1] = Pr[Execπ∪{Advdummy ,Zσ}(k, (i, z)) = 1] and
Pr[Execρ∪{Sim′,Zσ,i}(k, z) = 1] = Pr[Execρ∪{Sim′,Zσ}(k, (i, z)) = 1] is bounded by µ(k) for all i, k, z.
The game Execπ∪{Advdummy ,Zσ,i}(k, z) is depicted as network (III) in Figure 2 (except that we
denoted the external copy of π with πi). Observe that Execρ∪{Sim′,Zσ,i+1}(k, z) (note the changed
index i+1) contains the same machines as Execπ∪{Advdummy ,Zσ,i}(k, z) (when unfolding the simulation
performed by Zσ,i into individual machines) up to the fact that the communication with the i-th
instance of π is routed through the dummy-adversary Advdummy . However, the latter just forwards
messages, so π ∪ {Advdummy ,Zσ,i} and ρ ∪ {Sim
′,Zσ,i+1} are perfectly indistinguishable.
Using the triangle inequality, it follows that |Pr[Execπ∪{Advdummy ,Zσ,n}(k, z) = 1] −
Pr[Execρ∪{Sim′,Zσ,1}(k, z) = 1]| is bounded by n · µ(k) which is negligible. Moreover,
Execπ∪{Advdummy ,Zσ,n}(k, z) and Execσpi∪{Adv,Z}(k, z) describe the same game (up to unfold-
ing of simulated submachines and up to one instance of the dummy-adversary). Similarly,
Execρ∪{Sim′,Zσ,1}(k, z) and Execσρ∪{Sim,Z}(k, z) describe the same game (up to unfolding of simu-
lated submachines). Thus
∣
∣Pr[Execσpi∪{Adv,Z}(k, z) = 1]−Pr[Execσρ∪{Sim,Z}(k, z) = 1]
∣
∣ is negligible
and thus σπ ∪{Adv,Z} and σρ ∪{Sim,Z} are indistinguishable. Furthermore, since Adv and Sim′
are quantum-polynomial-time, so is Sim.
Since this holds for all Z, and the construction of Sim does not depend on Z, we have that σπ
computationally quantum-UC-emulates σρ.
The case of statistical quantum-UC-security is shown analogously, except that Adv and Z may
be unbounded, and Sim is only quantum-polynomial-time if Adv is. 
3 Relating classical and quantum-UC
We call a machine classical if its state transition operator is classical. A protocol is classical if all
its machines are classical.
Using this definition we can reformulate the definition of statistical classical UC in our frame-
work.
Definition 14 (Statistical classical-UC-security) Let protocols π and ρ be given. We say π
statistically classical-UC-emulates ρ iff for every set C ⊆ partiesπ and for every classical adversary
Adv there is a classical simulator Sim such that for every classical environment Z, πC ∪ {Adv,Z}
and ρC ∪ {Sim,Z} are indistinguishable. We furthermore require that if Adv is probabilistic-
polynomial-time, so is Sim.
Note that classical statistical UC is essentially the same as the notion of statistical UC-security
defined by Canetti [Can01].8 Thus, known results for statistical UC-security carry over to the
setting of Definition 14.
8Details such as the machine model and message scheduling are defined differently, of course. But since these
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The next theorem guarantees that if a classical protocol is statistically classical UC-secure, then
it is also statistically quantum-UC-secure. This allows, e.g., to first prove the security of a protocol
in the (usually much simpler) classical setting, and then to compose it with quantum protocols
using the universal composition theorem (Theorem 13).
Theorem 15 (Quantum lifting theorem) Let π and ρ be classical protocols. Assume that π
statistically classical-UC-emulates ρ. Then π statistically quantum-UC-emulates ρ.
Proof. Given a machine M , let C(M) denote the machine which behaves like M , but measures
incoming messages in the computational basis before processing them, and measures outgoing
messages in the computational basis. More precisely, the superoperator E
(k)
C(M) first invokes Eclass
on Hclass ⊗ Hquant , then invokes E
(k)
M on H
state ⊗ Hclass ⊗ Hquant , and then again invokes Eclass
on Hclass ⊗ Hquant . Since it is possible to simulate quantum Turing machines on classical Turing
machines (with an exponential overhead), for every machineM , there exists a classical machine M ′
such that C(M) and M ′ are perfectly indistinguishable.9
We define the classical dummy-adversary Advclassdummy to be the classical machine that is defined
like Advdummy (Definition 11), except that in each invocation, it first measures H
class , Hquant , and
Hstate in the computational basis (i.e., it applies Eclass to H
state⊗Hclass⊗Hquant) and then proceeds
as does Advdummy . Note that Adv
class
dummy is probabilistic-polynomial-time.
By Lemma 12, we only need to show that for any set C of corrupted parties, there exists
a quantum-polynomial-time machine Sim such that for every machine Z the real model πC ∪
{Z,Advdummy} and the ideal model ρ
C ∪ {Z,Sim} are indistinguishable.
The protocol π is classical, thus πC is classical, too, and thus all messages forwarded by
Advdummy from π
C to Z have been measured in the computational basis by πC , and all messages for-
warded by Advdummy from Z to π
C will be measured by πC before being used. Thus, if Adv would
additionally measure all messages it forwards in the computational basis, the view of Z would not be
modified. More formally, πC ∪{Z,Advdummy} and π
C ∪{Z,Advclassdummy} are perfectly indistinguish-
able. Furthermore, since both πC and Advclassdummy measure all messages upon sending and receiving,
πC∪{Z,Advclassdummy} and π
C∪{C(Z),Advclassdummy} are perfectly indistinguishable. Since it is possible
to simulate quantum machines on classical machines (with an exponential overhead), there exists a
classical machine Z ′ that is perfectly indistinguishable from C(Z ′). Then πC ∪ {C(Z),Advclassdummy}
and πC ∪{Z ′,Advclassdummy} are perfectly indistinguishable. Since Adv
class
dummy and Z
′ are classical and
Advclassdummy is polynomial-time, there exists a classical probabilistic-polynomial-time simulator Sim
(whose construction is independent of Z ′) such that πC ∪ {Z ′,Advclassdummy} and ρ
C ∪ {Z ′,Sim} are
indistinguishable.
Then ρC ∪ {Z ′,Sim} and ρC ∪ {C(Z),Sim} are perfectly indistinguishable by construction of
Z ′. And since both ρC and Sim measure all messages they send and receive, ρC ∪ {C(Z),Sim} and
ρC ∪ {Z,Sim} are perfectly indistinguishable.
Summarizing, we have that πC ∪{Z,Advdummy} and ρ
C ∪{Z,Sim} are indistinguishable for all
quantum-polynomial-time environments Z. Furthermore, Sim is classical probabilistic-polynomial-
details also considerably change between different versions of the full version [Can05], we feel justified in saying that
the notion of statistical classical UC is essentially the same as that formulated by Canetti.
9More precisely, for any set of machines N , the networks N ∪{M} and N ∪{C(M)} are perfectly indistinguishable.
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time and hence quantum-polynomial-time and its construction does not depend on the choice of Z.
Thus π statistically quantum-UC-emulates ρ. 
3.1 The computational case
We now formulate a computational analogue to the quantum lifting theorem (Theorem 15) from the
previous section. We cannot, however, expect a theorem of the following form: If π computationally
classical-UC-emulates ρ, then π computationally quantum-UC-emulates ρ. For example, if the
security of π is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm, then π may computationally classical-
UC-emulate ρ, but certainly π does not computationally quantum-UC-emulate ρ – a quantum-
polynomial-time adversary can easily compute discrete logarithms using Shor’s algorithm [Sho94].
Thus, in order to get a computational quantum lifting theorem, we need to give the adversary in
the classical setting the same computational power as in the quantum setting. Classical machines
that are as powerful as quantum-polynomial-time machines, we call QPPT machines.
Definition 16 (Quantum-strong PPT) A classical machine M is said to be QPPT (quantum-
strong probabilistic polynomial-time) if there is a quantum-polynomial-time machine M˜ such that
for any network N , N ∪ {M} and N ∪ {M˜} are perfectly indistinguishable (short: M and M˜ are
perfectly indistinguishable).
Definition 17 (QPPT classical UC security) Let protocols π and ρ be given. We say π QPPT
classical-UC-emulates ρ iff for every set C ⊆ partiesπ and for every QPPT adversary Adv there
is a QPPT simulator Sim such that for every QPPT environment Z, the networks πC ∪ {Adv,Z}
and ρC ∪ {Sim,Z} are indistinguishable.
Theorem 18 (Quantum lifting theorem – computational) Let π and ρ be classical protocols.
Assume that π QPPT classical-UC-emulates ρ. Then π computationally quantum-UC-emulates ρ.
Proof. We define C(M) and Advclassdummy as in the proof of Theorem 15.
By Lemma 12, we only need to show that for any set C of corrupted parties, there exists a
quantum polynomial-time machine Sim such that for every quantum-polynomial-time machine Z
the real model πC ∪ {Z,Advdummy} and the ideal model ρ
C ∪ {Z,Sim} are indistinguishable.
The protocol π is classical, so is πC is classical, and thus all messages forwarded by Advdummy
from πC to Z have been measured in the computational basis by πC , and all messages forwarded
by Advdummy from Z to π
C will be measured by πC before being used. Thus, if Adv would addi-
tionally measure all messages it forwards in the computational basis, the view of Z would not be
modified. More formally, πC ∪{Z,Advdummy} and π
C ∪{Z,Advclassdummy} are perfectly indistinguish-
able. Furthermore, since both πC and Advclassdummy measure all messages upon sending and receiving,
πC ∪{Z,Advclassdummy} and π
C ∪{C(Z),Advclassdummy} are indistinguishable. By definition of QPPT ma-
chines, and since C(Z) is quantum-polynomial-time, there is a QPPT machine Z ′ that is perfectly
indistinguishable from C(Z). Then πC ∪{C(Z),Advclassdummy} and π
C ∪{Z ′,Advclassdummy} are perfectly
indistinguishable. Since Advclassdummy and Z
′ are QPPT machines, there exists a QPPT simulator
Sim′ (whose construction is independent of Z ′) such that πC ∪{Z ′,Advclassdummy} and ρ
C ∪{Z ′,Sim′}
are indistinguishable.
Then ρC∪{Z ′,Sim′} and ρC∪{C(Z),Sim′} are perfectly indistinguishable by construction of Z ′.
And since both ρC and Sim′ measure all message they send and receive, ρC ∪{C(Z),Sim′} and ρC ∪
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{Z,Sim′} are perfectly indistinguishable. Since Sim′ is a QPPT machine, by definition there exists
a quantum-polynomial-time machine Sim such that Sim and Sim′ are perfectly indistinguishable.
Then ρC ∪ {Z,Sim′} and ρC ∪ {Z,Sim} are perfectly indistinguishable.
Summarizing, we have that πC ∪ {Z,Advdummy} and ρ
C ∪ {Z,Sim} are perfectly indistinguish-
able for all quantum-polynomial-time environments Z. Furthermore, Sim is quantum-polynomial-
time and its construction does not depend on the choice of Z. Thus π computationally quantum-
UC-emulates ρ. 
A word of caution: While the statistical quantum lifting theorem (Theorem 15) can be directly
applied to existing statistically UC-secure protocols, the computational variant of this theorem
cannot be directly applied to existing proofs. Although proving that a classical protocol is QPPT
classical UC-secure is probably simpler than directly performing the proof in the quantum setting,
at various places in a proof of QPPT classical UC-security one has to prove that the machines one
constructed from the adversary/environment are QPPT. (This needs to be done whenever a proof
step is done by reduction, and when showing that the final simulator is QPPT). As long as the
constructed machines simulate the original adversary as a black-box without rewinding, this will
be straightforward. However, when the constructed machine internally rewinds a QPPT machine,
showing that the constructed machine is also QPPT will be non-trivial. Thus, to apply Theorem 18
to an existing protocol, we need to carefully revisit the original proof, and we need to be aware of
the fact that the closure properties of the class of QPPT machines are not the same as those of the
class of PPT machines.
In this context, we formulate the following open problem: Can we formulate the class of all
QPPT machines as the class of all probabilistic-polynomial-time machines relative to a suitable
oracle? More precisely, is the following conjecture true?
Conjecture 19 There exists an oracle O (e.g., the decision oracle of a BQP-complete problem)
such that a classical machine M is QPPT if and only if there exists an oracle machine MˆO which
runs in probabilistic-polynomial-time and which is perfectly indistinguishable from M .
A positive answer to this question would allow rewinding of QPPT machines (since an oracle
machine MˆO can be rewound). However, the impact of such a positive answer would not be limited
to our setting; we expect that it would also allow a simple analysis of classical protocols in the
quantum stand-alone model, and of classical zero-knowledge proofs in the quantum setting.
4 Relation to the stand-alone model
In this section, we show that security in the quantum stand-alone model does, in some cases, already
imply quantum-UC-security. We will need this result as a tool for reusing parts of the proof given
by Damg˚ard et al. [DFL+09a] for their OT protocol. We first review the necessary parts of the
stand-alone model as defined by Fehr and Schaffner [FS09]. For details, see their paper.
The basic idea behind the stand-alone model is similar to that of the UC model. We are given
a protocol π and a functionality F , and we call the protocol π secure if any attack on π can be
simulated in an ideal model where the simulator only has access to the functionality F .10 We
will only need the special case of a two-party protocol in which Alice does not take any input. In
10In the stand-alone model, one usually call this functionality a function because it is required to be non-interactive,
first taking inputs from all parties, and then sending the computed outputs to all parties.
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Figure 3: Networks occurring in the proof of Theorem 20. Dashed boxes represent machines that
internally simulate other machines. Arrows between machines represent communication, and arrows
leaving the network represent the overall output of the network (indistinguishability is defined in
terms of that output). Dummy-parties and corruption parties are omitted for simplicity.
this case, we say that the protocol π implements F in the statistical quantum stand-alone model
for corrupted Bob if the following holds: For any adversary Adv, there is a simulator Sim such
that such that for any quantum state ρadv , the trace distance between the states ρreal and ρideal
is negligible. Here, the state ρreal is defined to be the joint state consisting of the output of Alice
and of the adversary after a protocol execution in which the adversary gets ρadv as his initial input.
The state ρideal is defined to be the joint state consisting of the output of Alice and of the simulator
after an execution in which the simulator first gets ρadv as his initial input, then may give arbitrary
inputs to F in the name of Bob, then gets the outputs for Bob from F , and then produces his
output.
Theorem 20 Fix a protocol π with parties Alice and Bob (not using any ideal functionality). As-
sume that in this protocol Alice takes no input, and that Alice does not accept messages after sending
her output.
Assume that the protocol π implements a two-party functionality F in the statistical quantum
stand-alone model for corrupted Bob.
Assume that the corresponding simulator is quantum-polynomial-time, that the simulator inter-
nally simulates the adversary as a black-box (and in particular, the description of the simulator
does not otherwise depend on the adversary), that the simulator does not rewind the adversary, and
that the simulator outputs the state output by the internally simulated adversary.
Then π statistically quantum-UC-emulates F in the case of corrupted Bob.
Proof. Fix an environment Z. By Lemma 12, we have to construct a simulator Sim such that the
probability that Z outputs 1 in the real and ideal model is negligibly close. (This simulator needs
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to be independent of the choice of Z.) Here, the real model Real consists of the environment Z,
the dummy-adversary Adv := Advdummy , the honest party A (Alice), and the corruption party B
C .
The ideal model Ideal consists of the environment Z, the simulator Sim, the functionality F , the
dummy-party A˜, and the corruption party BC .
Alice does not accept any messages after sending her output, so we can assume without loss of
generality that Z does not send any messages to Alice after receiving her output. Since Adv is the
dummy-adversary, we can assume that Z also does not send any messages to Adv after receiving
Alice’s output (since these messages would be routed through Adv through BC and then to Alice
and ignored). Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that after receiving Alice’s output,
Z does not send any messages, but performs a measurement D on its state and Alice’s output with
some outcome d ∈ {0, 1}. Then Z terminates with output d. Thus we can represent Z as consisting
internally of two machines Z ′ and D. The machine D gets the outputs of Z ′ and Alice and outputs
d. This situation is depicted in Figure 3, network Real .
We then define a network Real ′ which contains Z ′ instead of Z. See Figure 3. Let ρ(Real ′)
denote the joint output of Z ′ and Alice. Note that this output is not a single bit (as in Definition 3)
but a quantum state. Note that when applying the measurement D to ρ(Real ′), the distribution of
the measurement outcome is the distribution of the output of Z ′ in Real .
We then define a network Real ′′ which results from Real ′ by replacing Z ′ and Adv by a single
machine ZAdv which internally simulates Z
′ and Adv. See Figure 3. Then ρ(Real ′) = ρ(Real ′′).
Now, since π implements F in the statistical quantum stand-alone model, and since Z ′Adv is a
valid adversary in the quantum stand-alone model (it only interacts with the honest parties, but
does not provide inputs or get the outputs), we have that there is a simulator Sim′ such that the
trace distance between ρ(Real ′′) and ρ(Ideal ′′) is negligible. Here Ideal ′′ is the network consisting
of Sim′ and F .
By assumption, the simulator Sim′ internally simulates Z ′Adv as a black box and outputs what
the simulated Z ′Adv outputs. Hence we can represent Sim
′ as internally consisting of some two
machines: the adversary Z ′Adv, and some machine Sim
∗ that interacts with Z ′Adv. The construction
of Sim∗ does not depend on Z ′Adv, and Sim
∗ is quantum-polynomial-time since Sim′ is quantum-
polynomial-time by assumption. The output of Sim′ is that of Z ′Adv. Note further that Z
′
Adv by
construction also consists of two internally simulated machines Z ′ and Adv and outputs what Z ′
outputs. So the output of Sim′ is that of the internal Z ′. See Figure 3, network Ideal ′′.
The simulator Sim′ internally simulates Z ′, Adv, and Sim∗. We define Ideal ′ by replacing Sim′
in Ideal ′′ by Z ′ and Sim, where Sim is defined to internally simulate Adv and Sim∗. See Figure 3.
Then ρ(Ideal ′′) = ρ(Ideal ′).
Thus the trace distance between ρ(Real ′) and ρ(Ideal ′) is negligible. Furthermore, when apply-
ing the measurementD to ρ(Real ′), the distribution of the measurement outcome is the distribution
of the output of Z in Real . Similarly, when applying the measurement D to ρ(Ideal ′) is the distri-
bution of the output of Z in Ideal . Thus the statistical distance between the output of Z ′ in Real
and in Ideal is negligible. Thus Real and Ideal are indistinguishable.
Furthermore, since Sim consists of Adv and Sim∗, it is independent of Z. And since Sim∗
is quantum-polynomial-time, Sim is quantum-polynomial-time if Adv is. Thus π statistically
quantum-UC-emulates F in the case of corrupted Bob. 
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Parameters: Integers n, m > n, ℓ, a family F of universal hash functions.
Parties: The sender Alice and the recipient Bob.
Inputs: Alice gets no input, Bob gets a bit c.
1. Alice chooses x˜A ∈ {0, 1}m and θ˜A ∈ {+,×}m and sends |x˜A〉
θ˜A
to Bob.
2. Bob receives the state |Ψ〉 sent by the sender. Then Bob chooses θ˜B ∈ {+,×}m and measures
the qubits of |Ψ〉 in the bases θ˜B. Call the result x˜B .
3. For each i, Bob commits to θ˜Bi and x˜
B
i using one instance of F
B→A,1
COM each.
4. Alice chooses a set T ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} of size m− n and sends T to Bob.
5. Bob opens the commitments of θ˜Bi and x˜
B
i for all i ∈ T .
6. Alice checks x˜Ai = x˜
B
i for all i with i ∈ T and θ˜
A
i = θ˜
B
i . If this test fails, Alice aborts.
7. Let xA be the n-bit string resulting from removing the bits at positions i ∈ T from x˜A. Define
θA, xB , and θB analogously.
8. Alice sends θA to Bob.
9. Bob sets Ic := {i : θ
A
i = θ
B
i } and I1−c := {i : θ
A
i 6= θ
B
i }. Then Bob sends (I0, I1) to Alice.
10. Alice chooses s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(k) and f0, f1 ∈ F, output (s0, s1), and computes mi := si ⊕
fi(x
A|Ii) for i = 1, 2. Then Alice sends f0, f1,m0,m1 to Bob.
11. Bob outputs s := mc ⊕ fc(x
B |Ic).
Figure 4: Protocol πQROT for randomized oblivious transfer.
5 Oblivious transfer
Definition 21 (OT protocols) The protocol πQROT is defined in Figure 4. Fix a commitment
scheme com. The protocol πcomQROT is defined like πQROT, but instead of using the functionality FCOM,
the commitment scheme com is used. The protocol πQOT is defined like πQROT, with the following
modifications: Alice takes as input two ℓ(k)-bit strings v0, v1. In Step 10, Alice additionally sends
t0, t1 with ti := si ⊕ vi. Bob outputs s⊕ tc instead of s in Step 11.
We first analyze πQROT and will then deduce the security of πQOT from that of πQROT.
We first state the trivial cases (note for the uncorrupted case that we assume secure channels):
Lemma 22 The protocol πQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates F
A→B,ℓ
ROT in the case of no cor-
rupted parties and in the case of both Alice and Bob being corrupted.
5.1 Corrupted Alice
Lemma 23 The protocol πQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates F
A→B,ℓ
ROT in the case of cor-
rupted Alice.
Proof. First, we describe the structure of the real and ideal model in the case that the party A
(Alice) is corrupted:
In the real model, we have the environment Z, the adversary Adv, the corruption party AC , the
honest party B (Bob), and the 2m instances of the commitment functionality FCOM. The adversary
controls the corruption party AC , so effectively he controls the communication with Bob and the
inputs of FCOM. Bob’s input (a choice bit c) is chosen by the environment, and the environment
also gets Bob’s output (a bitstring s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ). See Figure 5(a).
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Figure 5: Networks occurring in the proof of Lemma 23. The dashed box represents the machine
Sim that internally simulates Adv, AC , FFakeCOM and B.
In the ideal model, we have the environment Z, the simulator Sim (to be defined below), the
corruption party AC , the dummy-party B˜, and the randomized OT functionality FROT. The
simulator Sim controls the corruption party AC and hence effectively chooses the inputs s0, s1
of FROT.
11 The input c of FROT is chosen by the dummy-party B˜ and thus effectively by the
environment Z. The output s := sc of FROT is given to the dummy-party B˜ and thus effectively
to the environment Z. See Figure 5(b).
To show Lemma 23, we need to find a simulator Sim such that, for any environment Z, the
real model and the ideal model are indistinguishable. To do so, we start with the real model, and
change the machines in the real model step-by-step until we end up with the ideal model containing
a suitable simulator Sim (which we define below in the description of Game 6). In each step, we
show that network before and after the step are perfectly indistinguishable.
Game 1. We replace FCOM by a commitment functionality FFakeCOM in which Bob (the sender)
can cheat. That is, in the commit phase, FFakeCOM expects a message commit from B (instead
of (commit, x)), and in the open phase, FFakeCOM expects a message (open, x) (instead of open)
and then sends (open, x) to Alice. We also change Bob’s implementation accordingly, i.e., when
Bob should commit to a bit b, he stores that bit b and gives it to FFakeCOM when opening the
commitment. Obviously, this change leads to a perfectly indistinguishable network (since Bob still
opens the commitment in the same way).
Game 2. Since Bob uses FFakeCOM instead of FCOM, he does not use the outcomes x˜
B
i of his
measurements before Step 5 (for i ∈ T ) or Step 11 (for i /∈ T ) of the protocol. Thus, we modify
Bob so that he performs the measurements with outcomes x˜Bi (i ∈ T ) in Step 5 (in particular, after
learning T ), and the measurements with outcomes xBi in Step 11. Delaying the measurements leads
to a perfectly indistinguishable network.
Game 3. The bits xBi with i ∈ I1−c are never used by Bob. Thus we can modify Bob to use
11Remember that, if Alice is corrupted, FROT behaves like FOT and takes inputs s0, s1 from Alice.
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the bases θAi instead of θ
B
i for these bits without changing the output of Z. Furthermore, since
θAi = θ
B
i for i ∈ Ic, we can modify Bob to also use the bases θ
A
i instead of θ
B
i when measuring
xBi with i ∈ Ic. Summarizing, we modify Bob to use θ
A instead of θB, and we get a perfectly
indistinguishable network.
Game 4. The bases θB are chosen randomly by Bob, and they are only used to compute the sets
I0 and I1. We change Bob to instead pick (I0, I1) as a random partition of {1, . . . , n}. Since this
leads to the same distribution of (I0, I1) and since θ
B is not used elsewhere, this leads to a perfectly
indistinguishable network.
Game 5. In Step 11, we change Bob to compute si := mi ⊕ fi(x
B |Ii) for i = 0, 1 and to output
s := sc. This leads to the same value of s as the original computation s := mc ⊕ fc(x
B |Ic), hence
the resulting network is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one. Note that now, Bob only
uses the choice bit c to pick which of the two values s0, s1 to output.
Game 6. We now construct a machine Sim that internally simulates the machines Adv, AC ,
FFakeCOM, and Bob. We let Sim run with an (external) corruption party A
C , and when (the
simulated) Bob computes s0, s1 in Step 11, Sim instructs the (external) corruption party A
C to
input s0, s1 into FROT (instead of letting Bob output s = sc). Then FROT will, given input c from
the dummy-party B˜, output sc to the dummy-party B˜. The dummy-party B˜ then forwards sc to
the environment Z. See Figure 5(c). The only difference with respect to the previous network
(besides a regrouping of machines) is that now sc is computed by FROT from s0, s1. However, FROT
computes sc in the same way as Bob would have done. Thus, the resulting network is perfectly
indistinguishable from the previous one.
Since the network from Game 6 (Figure 5(c)) is identical to the ideal model (Figure 5(b)), and
since the real model is perfectly indistinguishable from the network from Game 6, we have that the
real and the ideal network are perfectly indistinguishable.
Furthermore, Sim is quantum-polynomial-time if Adv is, and the construction of Sim does not
depend on the choice of the environment Z. Thus the protocol πQROT statistically quantum-UC-
emulates FA→B,ℓROT in the case of corrupted Alice. 
5.2 Corrupted Bob
We call a commitment scheme trivially extractable if, given the messages exchanged during the
commit phase, it is efficiently possible to determine the value to which the commitment will be
opened. Obviously, this directly contradicts the hiding property of the commitment, so trivially
extractable commitments are not overly useful. However, we need such commitments as an inter-
mediate construction in the following proofs. An example of a trivially extractable commitment is
one which sends the committed message in clear during the commit phase.
Corollary 24 (Stand-alone quantum OT [DFL+09a]) Let 0 < α < 1 and 0 < λ < 14 be
constants. Assume m = ⌈n/(1−α)⌉ and ℓ = ⌊λn⌋ and that n grows at least linearly in the security
parameter k.
Assume that com is a statistically binding, trivially extractable commitment scheme.
Then πcomQROT implements F
A→B,ℓ
ROT in the statistical quantum stand-alone model.
The corresponding simulator is quantum-polynomial-time, internally simulates the adversary as
a black-box, does not rewind the adversary, and outputs the state output by the internally simulated
adversary.
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Note that Damg˚ard et al. [DFL+09a] prove a slightly different result. First, it only assumes that
the commitment scheme com is extractable in the so-called common reference string (CRS) model.
That is, a globally known and trusted string, the CRS, is available to all parties, and it is possible to
extract the committed value when one is allowed to choose the CRS oneself. A trivially extractable
commitment can be seen as a special case with a zero-length CRS. Second, it only assumes that the
scheme is computationally binding, and thus only proves security in the computational quantum
stand-alone model. If we assume that the commitment is statistically binding instead, the same
proof shows security in the statistical quantum stand-alone model. Third, they analyze the protocol
πcomQOT, but the proof trivially adapts to π
com
QROT.
Lemma 25 Under the same assumptions on n,m, ℓ as in Corollary 24, the protocol πQROT statis-
tically quantum-UC-emulates FA→B,ℓROT in the case of corrupted Bob.
Proof. Let com be the following encryption scheme: To commit to a message m, the sender sends
(commit,m), and the recipient always accepts the commitment. To open the commitment, the
sender sends open, and the recipients accepts and output m. Obviously, this commitment is not
hiding. However, it is easily seen to be statistically binding and trivially extractable.
Consider the protocol πQROT. Here Bob sends the messages (commit,m) and open to the
commitment functionality, while in the protocol πcomQROT, Bob sends these messages directly to
Alice. In other words, the machine Alice in πcomQROT can be represented as a machine that internally
simulates the machine Alice from πQROT and the ideal functionality FCOM. Thus, as long as Alice
is honest, πcomQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FROT in the case of corrupted Bob if and only
if πQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FROT in the case of corrupted Bob.
By Corollary 24, πcomQROT implements FCOM in the statistical quantum stand-alone model in the
case of corrupted Bob with a simulator having the special properties listed in Corollary 24. Thus, by
Theorem 20, πcomQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FROT in the case of corrupted Bob. Thus
πQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FROT in the case of corrupted Bob. 
Theorem 26 Let 0 < α < 1 and 0 < λ < 14 be constants. Assume m = ⌈n/(1 − α)⌉ and ℓ = ⌊λn⌋
and that n grows at least linearly in the security parameter.
Then the protocol πQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates F
A→B,ℓ
ROT .
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 22, 23, and 25.
Theorem 27 Let 0 < α < 1 and 0 < λ < 14 be constants. Assume m = ⌈n/(1 − α)⌉ and ℓ = ⌊λn⌋
and that n grows at least linearly in the security parameter.
Then the protocol πQOT (Definition 21) statistically quantum-UC-emulates F
A→B,ℓ
OT .
Proof. Consider the following protocol π′QOT in the FROT-hybrid model. Given inputs v0, v1 ∈
{0, 1}ℓ(k) for Alice and a bit c for Bob, Bob invokes FROT with input c. Then Alice gets random
s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(k), and Bob gets s = sc. Then Alice sends t0, t1 with ti := vi ⊕ si to Bob. And Bob
outputs s⊕ tc. It is easy to see that π
′
QOT statistically classical-UC-emulates FOT. Hence, by the
quantum lifting theorem (Theorem 15), π′QOT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FOT. Note that
the protocol πQOT is the protocol resulting from replacing, in π
′
QOT, calls to FROT by calls to the
subprotocol πQROT. Furthermore, πQROT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FROT by Theorem 26.
Hence, by the composition theorem (Theorem 13), πQOT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FOT.

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6 Multi-party computation
Theorem 28 Let F be a classical probabilistic-polynomial-time functionality.12 Then there exists
a protocol π in the FCOM-hybrid model that statistically quantum-UC-emulates F . (Assuming the
number of protocol parties does not depend on the security parameter.)
Proof. Ishai, Prabhakaran, and Sahai [IPS08] prove the existence of a protocol ρFOT in the FOT-
hybrid model that statistically classical-UC-emulates F (assuming a constant number of parties).
By the quantum lifting theorem (Theorem 15), ρFOT statistically quantum-UC-emulates F . By
Theorem 27, πQOT statistically quantum-UC-emulates FOT. Let π := ρ
πQOT be the result of
replacing invocations to FOT in ρ
FOT by invocations of the subprotocol πQOT (as described in
Section 2.3). Then by the universal composition theorem (Theorem 13), π statistically quantum-
UC-emulates ρFOT . Using the fact that quantum-UC-emulation is transitive (Lemma 10), it follows
that π statistically quantum-UC-emulates F . 
We proceed to show that the result from Theorem 28 is possible only in the quantum setting.
That is, we show that there is a natural functionality that cannot be statistically classical-UC-
emulated in the commitment-hybrid model. To show this impossibility result, we first need the
following lemma.
Lemma 29 There is no classical two-party protocol (that runs in a polynomial number of rounds)
in the commitment-hybrid model that has the following properties:
• Let a ∈ {0, 1} denote Alice’s input, and b ∈ {0, 1} Bob’s input. Then Alice’s and Bob’s output
is a · b with overwhelming probability.
• The view of Alice in the case (a, b) = (0, 0) is statistically indistinguishable from the view of
Alice in the case (a, b) = (0, 1).
• The view of Bob in the case (a, b) = (0, 0) is statistically indistinguishable from the view of
Bob in the case (a, b) = (1, 0).
In all three cases we assume that Alice and Bob honestly follow the protocol (i.e., Alice and Bob are
honest-but-curious). The view of a party consists of all messages sent and received by that party
together with its input and random choices.
Proof. Assume a protocol π satisfying the properties from Lemma 29. We assume without loss
of generality that the last message sent in an execution of π contains the output of Alice. We
transform π into a protocol π′ that does not use commitments. Namely, when Alice would commit
to a value m, she instead sends committed to Bob, and when she would open that commitment,
she sends m to Bob. Analogously, we remove Bob’s commitments. The resulting protocol π′ still
satisfies the properties from Lemma 29 since we only consider honest-but-curious parties.
We use Lemma 33 from [MQU07a]: Let U , U˜ , L, L˜ be interactive machines that send only a
polynomially-bounded number of messages. Let 〈U,L〉 denote the transcript of the communication
12Subject to certain technical restrictions stemming from the proof by Ishai et al. [IPS08]: Whenever the function-
ality gets an input, the adversary is informed about the length of that input. Whenever the functionality makes an
output, the adversary is informed about the length of that output and may decide when this output is to be scheduled.
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in an interaction of U and L. Assume that 〈U,L〉 ≈ 〈U˜ , L〉 ≈ 〈U, L˜〉 where ≈ denotes statistical
indistinguishability. Then 〈U,L〉 ≈ 〈U˜ , L˜〉.
Let U be a machine executing Alice’s program in π′ on input 0, and let U˜ execute Alice’s
program on input 1. Let L and L˜ execute Bob’s program on inputs 0 and 1, respectively. Then
the properties in Lemma 29 guarantee that 〈U,L〉 ≈ 〈U˜ , L〉 ≈ 〈U, L˜〉. Hence 〈U,L〉 ≈ 〈U˜ , L˜〉.
This implies that the communication between Alice and Bob in π′ is indistinguishable in the cases
a = b = 0 and a = b = 1. This is a contradiction to the fact that in the first case, the last message
contains the output ab = 0, and in the second case, the last message contains the output ab = 1.

Definition 30 (AND) The functionality FAND expects an input a ∈ {0, 1} from Alice and b ∈
{0, 1} from Bob. Then it sends a · b to Alice and Bob.
Theorem 31 (Impossibility of classical multi-party computation) There is no classical
probabilistic-polynomial-time protocol π in the FCOM-hybrid model such that π statistically classical-
UC-emulates FAND.
Proof. The statistical UC-security of π would imply the properties listed in Lemma 29. Hence by
Lemma 29 such a protocol π does not exist. 
7 Conclusions
We have given a definition of quantum-UC-security that provides strong composability guarantees
for quantum protocols. We have shown that in this model, it is possible to construct statistically
secure oblivious transfer protocols given only commitments. Furthermore, we showed that a pro-
tocol which is secure in the statistical classical UC model is also secure in the statistical quantum
UC model. This simplifies the modular design of quantum protocols and allows us to construct
UC-secure general multi-party computation protocols given only commitments.
Directions for future work include:
• Combine the UC framework and the bounded quantum storage model. In this model,
Damg˚ard, Fehr, Salvail, and Schaffner [DFSS05] have constructed statistically hiding and
binding commitment schemes and statistically secure OT protocols. If variants of these pro-
tocols can be shown secure in the UC framework, this would allow to construct general UC-
secure multi-party computation protocols, only assuming that the adversary has a certain
upper bound on his quantum storage.
• Combine our result with the protocols for long-term classical UC-secure commitments by
Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh [MQU07b] (see Section 1.4). If their protocols can be shown to
be secure in the quantum setting, this would enable general long-term secure multi-party
computation based on practical setup-assumptions (the availability of signature cards).
• Find efficient constructions. Our protocol invokes a commitment for each qubit sent by Alice.
In some settings, a commitment can be quite expensive. For example, commitment protocols
in the bounded quantum storage model have a large quantum communication complexity. In
this setting, the efficiency of our protocol could be improved considerably if we were able to
use few string commitments instead of committing to each bit individually.
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• Find analogues to the quantum lifting theorem in other security models. In the stand-alone
model, it is an open question whether classically secure protocols are secure in the quantum
setting, too. Similarly, we do not know whether classically secure zero-knowledge proofs are
in general secure against quantum adversaries.
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